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Note
Must the Show Go On? Defining When One Party
May Call or Compel an Opposing Party's
Consultative Expert to Testify
Kathleen Michaela Brennan
Expert witnesses dominate the courtroom.' Litigators,
searching for the "perfect expert witness," consult and discard
numerous experts. 2 Commentators disagree whether the opposing party should be able either to call or compel these discarded
experts to testify. Courts seeking to regulate expert discovery
have been unable to reconcile the conflicting policy issues behind
the rules of discovery.
1. For an informative survey of the prevalence of expert witnesses, see
Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rnv. 1113, 1119. Of the 529
civil trials in the Gross sample, 86% had expert witnesses. Id. Each trial in
which experts appeared had an average of 3.8 experts. Id. In addition, 60% of
the expert witnesses were "repeat" witnesses who had testified as an expert at
least twice in the last six years. Id. at 1120. Another source that courts and
commentators often cite is Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under
Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part Two, an Empirical
Study and a Proposal,1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169. Graham conducted a survey of 222
federal judges and trial lawyers to determine their actual practices in discovering expert witnesses. Id. at 171; see also David S. Day, The Ordinary Witness
Doctrine: Discovery of the Pre-Retention Knowledge of a Nonwitness Expert
UnderFederalRule 26(b)(4)(B), 38 Aiuc L. REv. 763, 763 (1985) ("Modern litigation has entered an age of experts.") (collecting sources); Matthew R. Wildermuth, Note, Blind Man's Bluff. An Analysis of the Discovery of Expert
Witnesses Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) and a Proposed
Amendment, 64 IND. L. J. 925, 940-42 (1989) (noting increased use of experts).
2. Commentators criticize the current process of obtaining expert testimony as more concerned with style than substantive testimony. See, e.g.,
Gross, supra note 1, at 1126-35 (describing the superficial qualities that litigators seek in experts and the disgust that this shallow search engenders in all
of its participants-judges, lawyers and the experts themselves). One attorney
describes her ideal expert trial witness as someone "'around 50 years old, having some gray in his hair, wear[s] a tweedy jacket and smoke[s] a pipe.'" Id. at
1133 (quoting Hyman Hillenbrand, The Effective Use of Expert Witnesses, BRIEF
48-49 (1987)). Some experts revel in this showcase by advertising themselves
in legal publications as experienced courtroom performers. Id. at 1131 (describing expert advertisements in legal periodicals), 1132 (describing expert referral
services).
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Although this problem arises in various factual scenarios, 3
two cases exemplify the voluntary and compelled sides of the
consultative expert dilemma. 4 In Healy v. Counts,5 the plaintiff
in a medical malpractice action retained two doctors as consultative expert witnesses, but both experts determined there was no
malpractice. 6 One expert happened to know the attorney representing the defendant and, when the attorney asked the expert
to review the medical records, the expert realized the records
belonged to the same case and offered to testify for the defendant. 7 In Fenlon v. Thayer,8 the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action obtained a copy of a report from the defendant's
medical expert during pre-trial discovery. 9 The plaintiffs decided to subpoena the expert to testify at trial despite the expert's unwillingness to testify for them. 10
Most courts confronting the consultative expert dilemma
must decide whether they will admit the testimony of an expert
willing to testify for the adverse party." In a few cases, one
party asks the court to compel the expert's testimony. 12 Commentators that have addressed this issue tend to ignore the distinction. 13 This Note will focus on the more prevalent issue of
3. See, e.g., Levitsky v. Prince George's County, 439 A.2d 600, 604-06 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (allowing plaintiff to call an appraiser originally hired by
the defendant to testify in a condemnation award; the appraiser calculated a
high value for the plaintiffs property and the defendant thus decided not to call
the appraiser as a testifying expert).
4. The "consultative expert dilemma" hereinafter refers to whether, when
one party retains an expert and then elects not to use him, the opposing party
may then call or compel him to testify.
5. 100 F.R.D. 493, 493 (D. Colo. 1984).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 506 A.2d 319, 319 (N.H. 1986).
9. Id. at 320.
10. Id. at 320-321.
11. E.g., Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ariz. 1982) ("allowed");
Pinkett v. Brittingham, 567 A.2d 858, 859-61 (Del. 1989) ("allowed" and "permitted"); Knoff v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313, 319 (N.D. 1986)
("permit"); Lazorick v. Brown, 480 A.2d 223, 224 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984) ("allowed"); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1987) ("permit").
12. E.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972); Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 320-21 (N.H. 1986); Gilly v. City of New York, 516
N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 (N.Y. 1987); Young v. Strong, 499 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986).
13. This confusion extends to commentators' and courts' characterization of
the issue. For example, an American Law Reports article's title uses "compelling," yet most of the cases collected discuss "allowing" an expert to testify. Lori
J. Henkel, Annotation, Compelling Testimony of Opponent's Expert in State
Court, 66 A.L.R. 4TH 213 (1987).
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allowing the voluntary expert to testify, but will also address
arguments about compelling the testimony as necessary.
Despite the relative frequency 14 of the consultative expert
dilemma, no commentator has suggested a solution to the specific problem of either calling or compelling an expert formerly
retained by the adverse party to testify.' 5 Moreover, most
courts deciding this issue focus on Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and ignore the Federal Rules of Evidence.
This Note explains the conflicts raised by calling or compelling an adverse party's consultative expert witness to testify.
Part I explains the rules of procedure and evidence, and outlines
the conflicting case law. Part II criticizes courts applying rules
of discovery to this evidentiary issue and explains that no traditional privileges protect the expert's testimony. Part III proposes an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence to admit
the testimony of an adverse party's consultative expert if the
proffering party demonstrates a reasonable need for the testimony, subject to the trial court's discretion to exclude unduly
prejudicial testimony. This Note concludes that trial courts
should admit the testimony of a consultative witness, if the proffering party demonstrates a "reasonable need" for the expert's
testimony, to further open discovery policies, promote fairness,
and contribute to the pursuit of truth.
I.

A CONFUSING SCENARIO: OVERLAPPING RULES
AND CONFLICTING CASE LAW

Currently, courts and commentators use Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve the nontestifying expert
dilemma in civil trials.16 Expert testimony issues rarely arise in
criminal trials, 17 and this Note will only briefly consider the rel14. Dennis R. Suplee & Margaret S. Woodruff, The PretrialUse of Experts,
PR~c. LAw., Sept. 1987, at 9, 15 (describing situation as "not uncommon"). In
fact, the compelled consultative expert dilemma probably arises more often
than it is reported. Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule
26(b)(4) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure:Part One, An Analytical Study,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 935.
15. Gross describes the dilemma as one of many issues currently facing
expert witnesses and briefly discusses the conflicting perspectives and case law
surrounding it. Gross, supra note 1, at 1149-51.
16. See infra notes 54-55, 58 and accompanying text (collecting cases).
17. Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence
After Sixteen Years-The Effect of 'PlainMeaning' Jurisprudence,the Need for
an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestionsfor Selective
Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 857, 861 (1992) ("most problems
with expert testimony arise in civil cases."); see also discussion infra notes 121-
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evant criminal matters. This Note proposes the creation of Rule
707 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to provide a superior resolution of this problem.
A. RULE 26 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIvIL PROCEDURE AND
ITS CONFLICTING POLICIES

Most courts rely on either Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or its underlying policies to exclude expert testimony.' 8 Rule 26 prescribes the procedure for discovering expert
witnesses.' 9 Under Rule 26, discovery of expert witnesses involves a preliminary exchange of information 20 and possible
subsequent discovery by depositions, 2 ' interrogatories 2 2 and
other means of obtaining the expert's opinion or knowledge of
the facts at issue. The rule assigns expert witnesses to two
broad categories: "testifying experts" and "consultative experts,"2 3 which are those experts who will not testify at trial.
124 and accompanying text (describing effect proposed Federal Rule of Evidence will have on experts in criminal trials).
18. E.g., Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1980)
(ex parte contacts between defendant and plaintiffs consultative expert while
expert was employed by defendant constituted a "flagrant violation" of Rule
26(b)(4)(B)).
19. Rule 26(b)(1) allows for liberal discovery of "any matter.., relevant to
the subject matter involved" and Rule 26(b)(4) exclusively concerns expert witnesses and provides further guidelines for discovery of expert witnesses. FED.
R. Cmv. P. 26. Rule 26(b) reads, in relevant part:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts.
(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an
expert whose opinions may be presented at trial....
(B) A party may, through interrogatories or by deposition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained
or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness
at trial only as provided in Rule 35(b) [mental and physical examination reports] or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts
or opinions on the same subject by other means.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
20. The 1993 amendments to Rule 26 require each party to disclose automatically "to the other parties the identity of any person who may be used at
trial to present evidence." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2). Each party also must disclose a report detailing the expert's opinion, the basis for the opinion, the expert's qualifications, the compensation the expert will receive, and a list of
other cases in which the expert has testified in the preceding four years. Id.
21. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a)(5).
22. Id.
23. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) allows a party to depose experts who will testify at
trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) concerns experts "retained" by a party
"in anticipation of litigation" who are "not expected to be called as a witness at
trial." FED. R. CIrv. P. 26. Two additional categories include informally-con-
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Rule 26 grants the adverse party great latitude in conducting its discovery of testifying experts. 2 4 The policy behind
this liberal discovery rule is to allow the adverse party to prepare for an effective cross-examination. 2 5 Accordingly, each
party must identify its testifying experts, the topic about which
the expert will testify, the "substance" of the expert's opinion,
26
and a synopsis of the "grounds" of the opinion.
In contrast, Rule 26 restricts discovery of consultative experts. To obtain discovery of these experts, the party seeking
discovery must demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" rendering alternative discovery methods of the subject matter
"impracticable."2 7 Courts do not apply the "exceptional circumstances" rule in a uniform manner.28 This inconsistency stems,
in part, from the clashing objectives of Rule 26.
sulted experts a party does not retain and experts a party does not retain in
anticipation of litigation. Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp., 622 F.2d 496, 500501 (10th Cir. 1980). In Ager, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action refused to reveal the names of its nontestifying expert witnesses. Id. at 498. The
court remanded the case to determine whether the experts were retained, nontestifying experts, or informally-consulted experts. Id. at 504.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1970) (noting that the
need for more open discovery of testifying experts is evident in "the many cases
in which discovery of expert trial witnesses is needed for effective cross-examination and rebuttal, and yet courts apply the traditional doctrine and refuse
disclosure").
25. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(B) advisory committee's note (1970) ("Effective
cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation.").
26. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a)(2).
27. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (the party seeking discovery of the consultative expert must demonstrate "exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the
same subject by other means").
28. Compare Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d
984, 994 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (denying plaintiffs attempt to depose the defendant's consultative expert because the plaintiff had access to other bases of information and thus failed to demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" under Rule
26) and Mantolete v. Bolger, 96 F.R.D. 179, 182-83 (D. Ariz. 1982) (same) with
Coates v. AC & S, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 109, 110 (E.D. La. 1990) (allowing plaintiff to
depose defendant's expert about his conclusions concerning tissue samples
taken from decedent). In Coates, the court reasoned that exceptional circumstances existed because doctors had "difficulty in diagnosing mesothelioma" and
although both parties could interview many experts, each might find only one
supportive expert and the jury might incorrectly infer that experts evenly divided on the issue. Coates, 133 F.R.D. at 110.
In addition, commentators and courts do not always agree upon an interpretation of the "exceptional circumstances" test. Most commentators agree
that the opponent may not discover the names of consultative witnesses without showing exceptional circumstances. 8 CHARLEs A. WIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2032 (1970 & Supp. 1993); Note,
Discovery of Retained Nontestifying Experts'IdentitiesUnder the FederalRules
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Rule 26's treatment of expert testimony does not make
sense because the policy goals behind the rule conflict. 29 Generally, the drafters of Rule 26 strove to establish more open chan30
nels of discovery and, thereby, a freer exchange of information.
The drafters stressed the necessity of open discovery because, in
their view, effective cross-examination and readiness for trial require "advance preparation."31 Hence, most commentators, noting these liberal discovery policies, agree that attorneys may not
shield an expert from discovery or testimony simply because
that person is an expert witness.3 2 In addition, some commentators see no difficulty in allowing a party to contact an expert

of Civil Procedure, 80 MICH. L. REv. 513, 521-22 (1982) (arguing that parties
should not reveal the names of consultative experts). But see Bald v. B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Md. 1976) (concluding that one party
need not show exceptional circumstances to obtain the names, addresses and
"other identifying information" of the adverse party's consultative expert
witness).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note (1970) (referring to the
need for "advance preparation" for cross-examination and the "fear that one
side will benefit unduly from the other's better preparation"); Day, supra note 1,
at 791 n.161 (noting that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) forms a "middle ground" between the
conflicting policies of "open discovery" and no discovery).
30. Rule 26(b)(1) states that "Ip]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The drafters viewed discovery as a
means of "narrowing [the] issues and eliminat[ing] ... surprise." FED. R. Cirv.
P. 26(b) advisory committee's note (1970). The plain language of the rule thus
encourages open discovery. For an additional discussion of the liberal intent of
Rule 26, see Bockweg v. Anderson, 117 F.R.D. 563, 564-65 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
31. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note (1970). Furthermore,
"effective rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the
other side." Id.
32. See, e.g., Day, supra note 1, at 792 (asserting that consultative process,
not expert, is partially immunized from discovery); 10 FED. PRoc., L. Ed. § 26,
at 121 & n.60 (1988) (criticizing cases that excluded expert testimony solely
because witness was expert) (citing cases); Jack H. Friedenthal, Discovery and
Use of an Adverse Party'sExpert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455, 460 (1962)
("Without special justification, communications with an expert ought not to be
protected any more than communications of any other agent."); Kelly McDonald, Note, Gimme Shelter? Not If You Are a Non-Witness Expert Under Rule
26(b)(4)(B), 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (1988) (describing prevalent practice
of expert "sheltering" in which one party retains expert as consultative witness
solely to prevent adverse party from discovering expert's opinion); see also Carrasquillo v. Rothschild, 443 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (discussing
one party's ability to retain "outstanding" experts to "deny" the adverse party
"access" to these excellent experts). To resolve this harmful practice, Congress
should amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Solving the shielding of
consultative expert witnesses, however, falls outside the scope of this Note.
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favorable to its position, even if its opponent hired the expert
first.

33

Although open discovery benefits litigating parties, Rule 26
also seeks to prevent exploiting open discovery. The "unfairness
rule" thus embodies a second major policy underlying Rule 26. A
noted commentator defined the unfairness rule as follows: "it is
unfair for one party, without expense, to obtain information
from an expert who has been hired by the opposing party for an
agreed compensation."3 4 The unfairness rule encompasses two
policy arguments. The expert's testimony or knowledge may be
the expert's property; therefore, taking the testimony or compelling it without pay is unfair.35 In addition, the unfairness rule
asserts that unrestricted discovery procedures would "promote
36
laziness" and result in one side doing the work for both sides.
This rule discourages "free-riding," or building one's case upon
37
efforts of the opposing party.
Additionally, Rule 26 attempts to preserve the relationship
between attorneys and experts by protecting consultative experts from abusive discovery practices 38 and compelled testimony. Experts rely on their reputation for loyalty to the party
that hired them.3 9 Compelling experts' testimony could destroy
any reputation they have for loyalty by forcing them to testify
33. Gross, supra note 1, at 1150-51. In addition, a district judge for the
Eastern District of New York finds "nothing unethical" in one party's interviewing the opponents expert once it knows the opponent will not use the expert at
trial. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Discovery andAdmissibility of Expert Testimony,
63 NOTRE DAE L. REV. 760, 767-69 (1988) (collecting New York cases).
34. Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 479.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The advisory committee's note mentions its concern that "one side will
benefit unduly from the other's better preparation." FED. R. Cri. P. 26 advisory
committee's note (1970). One commentator has explained that Rule 26 requires
each side to prepare its case before opening the case to discovery and crossexamination. Day, supra note 1, at 797 n.193; see also Ager v. Jane C. Stormont
Hasp., 622 F.2d 496, 502 (10th Cir. 1980) (defining the unfairness rule as a rule
"designed to prevent a party from building his own case by means of his opponent's financial resources, superior diligence and more aggressive
preparation").
38. One commentator has suggested that Rule 26 strives to avoid discovery
abuse, by preventing the distortion of evidence, protecting nontestifying expert
availability and providing clear rules for courts to follow. Day, supra note 1, at
792; see also McDonald, supra note 32, at 1030 (describing expert shielding and
concluding that it violates drafters' intent in Rule 26 for more liberal discovery).
39. See James B. Platt, Comment, Discovery of the Nonwitness Expert
Under FederalRule of Civil Procedure26(b)(4)(B), 67 IowA L. REV. 349, 363-64
n.10 (1982) (arguing that expert's career success depends, in large part, upon
her reputation for loyalty to hiring party).
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for the other side. Compelling expert testimony might discourage experts from acting as consultative witnesses, diminishing
the pool of eligible experts. 40 In particular, experts who testify
for unpopular parties, such as doctors who testify for plaintiffs
41
in medical malpractice suits, are already few in number.
Parties also use the attorney-client privilege 42 and the work
product rule4 3 to prevent courts from compelling their consultative expert to testify for their opponent. 44 The attorney-client
privilege protects communications made by the client to the at40. E.g., Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 497 (D. Colo. 1984) (expressing
concern about negative impact that adverse consultative expert testimony
would have on available medical experts in medical malpractice actions); Ager,
622 F.2d at 503 (refusing discovery because it "would inevitably lessen the
number of candid opinions available as well as the number of consultants willing to even discuss a potential medical malpractice claim with counsel").
41. Ager, 622 F.2d at 503 (noting "widespread aversion" of medical experts
to medical malpractice litigation and limited availability of nontestifying medical experts, and concluding that "absent special circumstances, discovery evaluative consultants' identity [should] be denied"); see also Healy, 100 F.R.D. at
497 (arguing that allowing consultative witness to testify for adverse party
would diminish "pool of potential expert medical [malpractice] witnesses"). One
commentator includes school desegregation experts, who testify on behalf of
school districts charged with segregation, within this caste of unpopular experts. Gross, supra note 1, at 1131 n.55.
Some courts, in contrast, use the particular role of doctors as experts in
medical malpractice cases to bolster the contacts allowed between the expert
and the adverse party. In Lazorick v. Brown, 480 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984), for example, the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
the doctors treating the patient owed the plaintiff a duty of loyalty which forbade contact with the defendants. Id. at 229. The Lazorick court reasoned that
the experts "may sympathize with another doctor who they believe has been
unjustly accused of malpractice. They may feel an obligation to see justice done
as they view it." Id.
42. At least one court has established a precise definition of the common
law attorney-client privilege:
[Wihere legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, the communications relevant to that
purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor except the protection be waived.
8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 28, § 2017, at 133 (quoting Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., 23 F.R.D. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)).
43. Rule 26 defines the attorney work product rule: "[tihe court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." FED. R. Cr. P. 26(b)(3).
44. Several commentators have listed these two rules and add the "rule of
unfairness" as a third rationale. Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 455; David G.
Crockett, Note, Civil Procedure-Discovery of Expert Information, 47 N.C. L.
REv. 401, 403-04 (1969).
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torney in her capacity as attorney. 45 This privilege encourages
frank and open communication between the client and attorney
so that the attorney can best assist the client. 4 6 The work product rule 47 protects documents prepared in anticipation of litigation by the attorney or by a "representative" acting on behalf of
the party.48 In the context of the discovery of experts, courts
must decide whether an expert qualifies as a party's "representative."49 The attorney-client privilege and the work product
rule, however, do not compel courts to exclude disputed expert
testimony; in fact, courts have argued to the contrary. 50 Absent
such a privilege, the trial court should admit the testimony.5 1
B.

A MAZE

OF CONFLICTING CASE LAw UNDER RULE

26

Most commentators agree that federal and state courts have
mishandled the issue of admitting the testimony of an expert
originally retained by the opponent. 52 Courts employ the policy
45. See supra note 42 (defining attorney-client privilege). When deciding
whether the attorney-client privilege prohibits discovery or compelled testimony, courts often employ criteria that evaluate the "type of agent" who communicated with the attorney and "the nature of the communication."
Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 457 (citing cases).
46. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 28, § 2032 (citing cases).
47. The work product rule is not a privilege, but a judicially-developed theory designed to protect an attorney's thought processes in building a case. See
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, the Supreme Court held
that "written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal duties.... fall[ ] outside the arena of discovery." Id. at 510. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure codify the Hickman decision in Rule 26. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3).
48. Jan W. Henkel & 0. Lee Reed, Work ProductPrivilege and Discovery of
Expert Testimony: Resolving the Conflict Between FederalRules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4), 16 FiLa. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 317 (1988) (contending
that work product rule includes almost "any" representative acting on behalf of
party's attorney).
49. See Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 471-74 (discussing case law distinguishing attorneys from their "agent" for work product purposes).
50. E.g., Sun Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 407 So. 2d 938, 939
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that "[t]he traditional barriers to this practice-work product privilege, attorney-client privilege, and 'unfairness'-have
been substantially eroded in this context").
51. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEiNsTE&s EVIDENCE,
T 501[06], at 501-66 (1993) (citing cases) [hereinafter WEINsTEIN].
52. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 14, at 934 (stating that the "law is unclear"); Crockett, supra note 44, at 406 ("Confrontation with the morass of case
law on discovery of expert information should dispel a court's temptation to resolve a case solely on the basis of precedent. Surely decisions can best be
reached through consideration of each case's individual circumstances in the
light of underlying discovery policy."); James L. Hayes & Paul T. Ryder, Jr.,
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considerations underlying Rule 26 in a contradictory fashion to
both exclude 53 and admit 5 4 the consultative expert's testimony.
Some courts rely upon the rule's plain language to exclude the
testimony.5 5 In contrast, other courts allow counsel to question
the expert witness about his original consultation with the opponent because the questioning affects the weight and credibility
of the expert's testimony. 56 Finally, still other courts seek to
strike a middle ground, admitting testimony from the opponent's rejected consultative expert, but excluding testimony
57
about the expert's original position with the opponent.
When courts exclude testimony from the opponent's consultative expert, they typically base their decision on the policy reaNote, Rule 26(b)(4) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Discovery of Expert
Information, 42 U. MLtI L. REv. 1101, 1163 (1988) (noting that, in issue of
compelling opponent's consultative expert to testify, question remains
unanswered).
53. E.g., Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984) (excluding
consultative expert's testimony because proffering party "circumvented" discovery rules in bad faith); Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 496 (D. Colo. 1984)
(excluding testimony of doctor originally retained by plaintiffs in medical malpractice action); Young v. Strong, 499 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(relying upon unfairness rule to exclude consultative expert's testimony and
stating that "[wihere there is no difficulty in obtaining other expert testimony,
one party may not call as a witness another party's expert").
54. E.g., Lazorick v. Brown, 480 A.2d 223, 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984) (admitting all competent and relevant evidence that is not privileged);
Carrasquillo v. Rothschild, 443 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (allowing
a consultative expert to testify because the court reasoned that the goal of litigation is to find the truth); Board of Educ. of S. Sanpete Sch. Dist. v. Barton,
617 P.2d 347, 350 (Utah 1980) (allowing consultative expert's testimony because it would contribute to weight and substance of defendant's testimony).
55. E.g., Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24,26-27 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding that ex parte meetings between defendant and expert retained by
plaintiff constituted a "flagrant violation" of Rule 26). The Campbell court did
not specify which provision of Rule 26 the defendant's actions violated. See id.
at 27.
56. E.g., Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 322-23 (N.H. 1986) (holding that
plaintiff in medical malpractice action may subpoena medical expert originally
retained by defendant and question expert about prior employment with defendant); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1987) (same); Barton, 617 P.2d at 350 ("The jury was entitled to know the essential background facts of the witness so as to be able to give proper weight to
his testimony.").
57. E.g., Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Ariz. 1982) (prohibiting
defense questioning of medical expert on direct examination about prior consultation with plaintiff); Sun Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 407 So. 2d 938,
940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing plaintiff to call appraiser originally retained by City of Orlando to testify, but prohibiting plaintiff from questioning
appraiser about previous employment with city).
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sons underlying Rule 26(b), not its actual language. 58 If they
first determine that using the adverse party's consultative expert unfairly advantages the proffering party, they will exclude
the testimony because it allows the proffering party to rely upon
60
its opponent's work, 5 9 violating the unfairness rule.
Other courts exclude the testimony because admitting it
would put the opposing party in the "no-win" situation of crossexamining its own consultative witness. 61 The cross-examining
party might hesitate to attack the expert's credentials or credibility for fear that, in rebuttal, the opposing party would point
out that the expert's qualifications were acceptable to the crossexamining party when the party first hired the expert. 62 Moreover, the cross-examining party might be forced to impeach the
expert's testimony with information that the expert obtained
during previous employment with that party.63 Traditional
cross-examination tactics thus fail against the expert originally
retained by the cross-examiner.
58. Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 495 (D. Colo. 1984) (noting that the
fact situation fell "beyond the explicit language of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)" and commenting that there was "virtually nothing in print to guide [the trial court's]
decision" to exclude or admit the expert's testimony). The Healy judge continued by stating that "[mly decision is guided by several policy decisions." Id. at
496; see also Piller v. Kovarsky, 476 A.2d 1279, 1281 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1984) (preventing physician who treated plaintiff in medical malpractice action
from testifying for defense by relying, interalia, upon public policy reasoning).
59. E.g., Young v. Strong, 499 N.Y.S.2d 988,990 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(compelling defendant's surveyor to testify for plaintiffs would be unfair, especially when plaintiff already has another expert); Brink v. Multnomah County,
356 P.2d 536, 541 (Or. 1960) (contending that by allowing disputed expert testimony, court would unfairly penalize hard-working trial lawyers and would reward laziness); see also Henkel, supra note 13, at 236-38 (collecting cases).
60. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (defining the unfairness
rule).
61. E.g., Healy, 100 F.R.D. at 496-97 (expressing concern that court could
not "adequately protect" party that originally hired consultative witness).
62. See, e.g., Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Ariz. 1982) (reasoning that "[airguably, that prior consultation [between adverse party and expert]
might be an admission that plaintiff believed the witness to be qualified");
Piller,476 A.2d at 1282 (asserting that "defendants [proffering party] have an
unfair advantage when they present [the plaintiffs' consultative expert] because the plaintiffs have already necessarily vouched for his credibility and the
value of his opinions").
63. See, e.g., Granger,656 P.2d at 1243 (refusing to allow plaintiffs former
consultative expert to testify for defendant primarily because plaintiff would be
unable to cross-examine expert effectively and stating that "[cdross-examination
is a difficult art which is not made easier when counsel must perform it on a
tightrope").
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Courts that admit or compel the expert's testimony either
64
ignore Rule 26 or claim that Rule 26 does not apply. Most
65
courts that overlook Rule 26 admit or compel the expert's testimony after determining that no privilege protects it.66 These
courts argue that it is unfair to "shield"67 an expert from discovery and deny the adverse party access to the potentially helpful
68

expert.
Even if courts admit the disputed expert testimony, they do

not agree whether the the proffering party may question the witness about prior employment with the opposing party.69 Courts
64. Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 27,
1986) (stating that Rule 26 applies to the discovery of expert testimony, not to
the potential suppression of expert testimony); Granger,656 P.2d at 1242 (reasoning that Rule 26 "does not address itself to the admissibility at trial of the
testimony of such an expert which is elicited by the opponent" and that "the
rules of discovery provide no express basis for the suppression of such testimony"); Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 321 (N.H. 1986) (concluding that Rule
26 does not control testimony at trial).
65. See Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 322 (stating that "the rule favoring testimonial
compulsion should be applied to all experts, including doctors, appraisers, and
others").
66. See, e.g., Sun Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 407 So. 2d 938, 939
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing plaintiffs to call appraiser originally retained by City of Orlando to testify at trial because no privileges protected appraiser's testimony); Knoff v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313,
319-320 (N.D. 1986) (allowing defendant-corporation in nuisance action to call
appraiser originally hired by plaintiff to testify at trial because expert fell
outside scope of traditional privileges); Board of Educ. of S. Sanpete Sch. Dist.
v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347, 349-50 (Utah 1980) (admitting expert testimony of appraiser in eminent domain action because it concerned "the heart of the issue at
trial," fell outside of any evidentiary privileges, and jury was entitled to hear it).
67. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discribing expert shielding).
68. E.g., Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1381 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1987) ("No party to litigation has anything resembling a proprietary right to
any witness's evidence."); Lazorick v. Brown, 480 A.2d 223, 228 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984) ("Even an expert whose knowledge has been purchased cannot
be silenced by the party who is paying him on that ground alone.") (quoting Doe
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983)). Some attorneys regularly
"shield" experts by retaining the experts as consultative witnesses to avoid discovery by the adverse party. Gross, supra note 1, at 1131 n.54; see also McDonald,supra note 32, at 1030 (noting importance of good faith conduct in pre-trial
discovery).
69. To obtain an overview of this conflicting case law, compare cases excluding the questioning, such as Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765,
at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1986); Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Ariz.
1982); Sun Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 407 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); Knoffv. American Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313, 319 (N.D.
1986), with those cases that admit the questioning of the experts about their
original employment with the adverse party, Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319,
323 (N.H. 1986); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1987); Levitsky v. Prince George's County, 439 A.2d 600, 606 (Md. Ct.
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that allow the party to question the consultative expert assert
that the trier of fact ought to know about the expert's prior dealings with the opposing party because it relates to the weight and
credibility of the expert's opinion. 70 Testimony about the expert's original employer allows an attorney to expose the expert's bias. 7 ' The trier of fact should know whether one side
"shopped" for an expert to support its theory of the case. 7 2 These
courts thus admit or compel the expert's testimony because it is
relevant, probative, and falls outside protective privileges.
On the other hand, some courts refuse to allow the proffering party to question the expert about prior employment with
the adverse party because this questioning would overemphasize the witness in the jury's mind73 or because such questioning
would be too prejudicial. 74 Other courts reason that by granting
the expert to
the party's request to subpoena the expert or allow
75
testify, the party already has the upper hand.
Spec. App. 1982); Board of Educ. of S. Sanpete Sch. Dist. v. Barton, 617 P.2d
347, 351 (Utah 1980).
70. E.g., Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 323 (finding that "the fact that a party's adversary first contacted the expert is material to the weight and credibility of
that expert's testimony"). But see Sun Charm Ranch, 407 So. 2d at 940 (concluding that the "relevancy of this evidence is the inference that the party who
fails to call an expert is covering up harmful evidence or concealing bad facts"
but the party may have other legitimate reasons for not calling expert whom
the party originally consulted).
71. JOHN KAPLAN, et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 505 (7th ed.
1992) (concluding that "[piroof ofbias and the like is always relevant to credibility and can be inquired into thoroughly"); see also Barton, 617 P.2d at 350 (reasoning that jury should know essential facts about witness's background in
order to give proper weight to testimony).
72. E.g., Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 323 ("Whether an expert is a hired gun' or one
whose opinions have greater foundations of objectivity is an issue to be litigated
by counsel and considered by the jury."); Cogdell, 531 A.2d at 1382 (same).
73. These courts fear that juries would give the expert's testimony too
much weight because both parties retained the same expert. Wildermuth,
supra note 1, at 943 (citing cases).
74. Sun Charm Ranch, 407 So.2d at 940 (questioning fairness of rule that
would require party to explain and apologize to jury for not calling expert witness to testify). Cf. State Highway Comm'n v. Earl, 143 N.W.2d 88, 92 (S.D.
1966) (concluding that when adverse party calls the opponent's former consultative expert, "[tjhe party calling such expert makes [the expert] his witness,
therefore, the fact of prior employment or payment by the opposite party is not
relevant or material").
75. E.g., Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765, at *5 (D. Kan. Mar.
27, 1986) (stating that although prohibiting questions to expert witnesses about
prior retention by plaintiffs may restrict defendants' ability to rehabilitate expert witness, that is small price to defendants for right to present expert testimony at trial).
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AN ALTERNATIVE TO RULE 26: RELEVANT RULES OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Some courts use the Federal Rules of Evidence to resolve
the consultative expert dilemma, arguing that Rule 26 does not
apply. 7 6 These courts turn to Rules 702, 703 and 403 to provide
another framework to evaluate the admission of consultative expert testimony. Rule 702 regulates the testimony of expert witnesses 77 and requires that the expert's testimony "assist" the
jury.78 Rule 703 stipulates that an expert may base an opinion
upon facts and information directly observed by the expert or
"made known" to the expert before the testimony.7 9 As long as
the expert uses a type of information "reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field" to establish an opinion, the actual
information that the expert used need not be admissible
evidence.8 0
These rules of evidence confer considerable discretion upon
the trial courts to admit evidence and testimony that the courts
consider relevant. 8 ' Testimony is relevant if it tends to make
the existence of one or more facts in issue more probable than
they would be without the testimony.8 2 The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized the potential danger in al76. See, e.g., Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 495 (D. Colo. 1984) (conceding that Rule 26 does not apply); Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Ariz.
1982) (stating that Rule 26 and the rules governing discovery do not concern
admission of expert testimony at trial); Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 321
(N.H. 1986) (stating that Rule 26 does not control); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d
1379, 1381 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (same).
Admittedly, some tension exists between the rules governing discovery and
the Federal Rules of Evidence. "Handling the opponent's expert has become
more. difficult because the rules of evidence have been liberalized over the
years, while the rules of discovery recently have been restricted." Paul F. Rothstein, The Collision Between New DiscoveryAmendments and Expert Testimony
Rules, LrrIG., Spring 1988, at 17; cf. McLaughlin, supra note 33, at 765 (noting
that federal discovery rules "give [adverse parties] nothing and damn little of
that").
77. Rule 702 states "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert... may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. Evm. 702.
78. Id.
79. FED. R. EviD. 703.
80. Id; see also McLaughlin, supra note 33, at 766 (describing Rule 703
parameters).
81. McLaughlin, supra note 33, at 765; see also 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note
51, T 403[01], at 403-6 (noting broad discretion that Rule 403 gives to trial
courts).
82. FED. R. EviD. 401 (defining relevant evidence as evidence having "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
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lowing relevant but unfairly prejudicial evidence to sway the
jury.8 3 Accordingly, Rule 403 allows a trial court to exclude relevant evidence whose probative value is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."8 4 The rules of
evidence thus provide this safety net to exclude potentially inflammatory evidence.
The conflicting case law in both federal and state courts
demonstrates a need for a uniform approach to the consultative
expert dilemma. Policies underlying both Rule 26 and Rules
702, 703 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence can play a
decisive role in the unification process.
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM INADEQUATELY
ADDRESSES THE CONSULTATIVE EXPERT
DILEMMA
Courts have inconsistently resolved the consultative expert
dilemma.8 5 This confusion in the law results from the inappropriate reliance of courts and litigators upon Rule 26 and claims
of privilege to exclude consultative expert testimony.
A.

RULES OF DIscovERY Do NOT APPLY TO THE CONSULTATIVE
EXPERT DILEMMA

Rule 26 has nothing to do with admitting or compelling consultative expert testimony.8 6 The adverse party seeking to produce the expert does not wish to obtain more information
through formal discovery, but wishes to put the expert on the
ruination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence").
83. FED. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note.
84. Rule 403 reads: "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R.
Evm. 403. Trial courts may apply Rule 403 to "all forms of evidence." 1 WEINsTErN, supra note 51, 1 403[01], at 403-06.
For instances in which courts have applied the Rule 403 balancing test to
expert testimony admissible under Rule 703, see, e.g., Scott v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055-56 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that trial court should have
applied Rule 403 to exclude "human factors" [ergonomics] expert's testimony
describing location of alleged personal injury as an "accident waiting to
happen").
85. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting
case law).
86. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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witness stand to add to the trial record.8 7 This distinction separates expert discovery from expert testimony.8 8 For example, to
question a consultative expert about opinions in a deposition or
interrogatory, Rule 26 requires a party to demonstrate "exceptional circumstances."8 9 If, however, that party calls the expert
to testify on the assumption that the expert's opinion is
favorable because the opposing party declined to list the expert
as a witness, the disputed testimony ceases to be discovery and
becomes instead an evidentiary matter.9 0
B.

No

PRIVILEGE PROTECTS THE EXPERT FROM COMPELLED OR

VOLUNTARY TESTIMONY

Although litigators rely on the attorney-client privilege and
the work product rule to protect either compelled or voluntary
consultative expert testimony, these privileges do not apply.
Courts also recognize similar professional rules of conduct
within the experts' profession that would exclude their testimony for an opposing party.91 Because privileges impede the
condiscovery of the truth,92 however, courts should narrowly
93
strue them and admit evidence absent a privilege.
The attorney-client privilege does not preclude the admission of expert testimony. The advisory committee's note to Rule
87. KAPLAN, et al., supra note 71, at 1-2, 64 (emphasizing the importance of
the trial record).
88. Some courts distinguish these procedural rules. See, e.g., Rancourt v.
Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 223 A.2d 303, 305 (Me. 1966) ("Rule 26(b) is
neither limited by nor does it limit, the admissibility of evidence at trial. No
new privilege operative to keep otherwise admissible evidence from the Court
and jury was thereby created. The Rule was designed to regulate the discovery
and deposition process before the trial. . . ."); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (stating that discovery rules do not address expert testimony).
89. FED.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
90. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
91. This is true for attorneys, MODEL CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR5-101 (1981), and, to some degree, for doctors; see, e.g., Piller v. Kovarsky, 476 A-2d 1279, 1282-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (barring a
physician treating the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action from testifying
for the defendants); cf. Arctic Motor Freight, Inc. v. Stover, 571 P.2d 1006,
1008-09 (Alaska 1977) (discussing the extent to which plaintiff waives patientdoctor privilege by filing personal injury claim, thus allowing defense to obtain
information about plaintiff's medical history).
92. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 28, § 2016, at 124 (noting that
"[p]rivileges are created to foster a relation that the state deems of such importance that it will encourage it even at the price of excluding helpful testimony").
93. Knoffv. American Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313, 319 (N.D. 1986)
(stating that because rules of privilege inherently work against search for
truth, courts must construe them narrowly).
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26 discourages interpreting the rule to exclude expert testimony
under a broadly-construed privilege theory. 94 In fact, most
courts distinguish expert witnesses from attorneys for purposes
of the attorney-client privilege. 95 Moreover, the attorney-client
privilege like the work product rule does not generally apply to
information possessed by experts. 9 6 Expert witnesses, unlike
interpreters for instance, are not necessary to confidential attor97
ney-client conversations.
Some courts prohibit an opposing party from compelling the
opponent's consultative expert witness to testify by using the attorney-client privilege. 98 This exclusion, however, applies only
to communications made by the client to the expert actingas the
attorney's agent.99 Generally, the adverse party who compels
the opponent's consultative witness to testify seeks the actual
opinion of the expert, based upon information that the attorney
provided to the expert. This set of communications does not involve the client.' 0 0
94. The 1970 amendments to the rules were meant to "repudiate the few
decisions that have held an expert's information privileged simply because of
his status as an expert .... " FED. R. Cirv. P. 26 advisory committee's note
(1970). Furthermore, the 1970 amendments "also reject as ill-considered the
decisions which have sought to bring expert information within the work-product doctrine." Id.
95. E.g., Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 223 A.2d 303, 304
(Me. 1966) (concluding that relationship between expert appraiser and party is
not equivalent to attorney-client relationship); Levitsky v. Prince George's
County, 439 A.2d 600, 605 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (holding that appraiser is
neither client nor attorney for purposes of attorney-client privilege).
96. E.g., 2 WEiNsTEIN, supra note 51, S1503(a)(3)[011, at 503-37 to 503-38
(stating that "the expert's observations, conclusions and information derived
from sources other than the client's communication constitute the expert's
knowledge, which, like the client's knowledge and the attorney's knowledge, is
not privileged"); 10 FED. PROC., supra note 32, § 26:121, at 357 (noting that
work product rule does not exempt discovery of expert information); Note, supra
note 28, at 520 n.33 (commenting that scholarly reviews debunked idea that
attorney-client privilege or work product rule shields expert's knowledge); Morgan Chu, Discovery of Experts, LITIG., Winter 1982, at 13, 16 (arguing that expert information falls outside work product rule if counsel may show
information to expert, while refusing to show information to opposing party).
97. Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 463 (arguing that expert witnesses contribute much more to trial preparation than "interpreter" would); Gross, supra
note 1, at 1151 (criticizing courts that treat experts like agents of the party and
thus include experts within the scope of the attorney-client privilege).
98. Marjorie P. Lindblom, CompellingExperts to Testify: A Proposal,44 U.
Cm. L. REv. 851, 853 n.9 (1977) (citing cases and other authorities).
99. Id.
100. Arguably, a more difficult scenario results when a client reveals information when both the attorney and the consultative expert are present. In that
situation, the client is not certain of confidentiality. The rationale behind the
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The attorney work product rule' 01 also does not apply to
consultative expert testimony. In essence, this rule protects
records of an attorney's thought processes.' 0 2 Even if the consultative witness contributes to the attorney's preparation for
trial, the attorney's labor did not create the expert. Litigation
publications, in contrast, encourage attorneys to consider any
and consultative) discoverwork given to experts (both10testifying
3
able by the adverse party.
Deep-rooted policy concerns support the admission of the
opponent's consultative expert's testimony. Trial courts assert
repeatedly that the true mission of litigation is to find "the
truth."10 4 If this assessment is correct, then trial courts should
presumptively admit expert testimony helpful to the fact
finder's determination of "the truth." This argument supersedes
claims of privilege or unfairness. 10 5
Because Rule 26 does not address the issue of consultative
expert testimony, courts must turn elsewhere to aid their deciattorney-client privilege promotes full disclosure to attorneys to obtain informed legal advice. See supra notes 42, 45-46 and accompanying text (describing attorney-client privilege). Including expert insights within legal advice
stretches the attorney-client privilege well beyond its underlying rationale.
101. See supra notes 43, 47-49 and accompanying text (explaining work
product rule).
102. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 28, § 2021, at 178-79 (citing cases and
noting difficulty in determining when one party "may inspect documents developed in the course of his opponent's preparation of the case").
103. George Vernon, ProtectingYour Expertfrom Discovery, FOR DEF., June
1989, at 16, 19. Vernon further advises trial lawyers not to give selected documents to a consultative witness, recommending instead that attorneys provide
the expert with information that both bolsters and criticizes their side. Id. In
this way, even if the adverse party discovers the actual reports provided to the
experts, the adverse party will be unable to determine the attorney's theory of
the case. Id.
104. E.g., Coates v. AC & S,Inc., 133 F.R.D. 109, 110 (E.D. La. 1990) ("[Tlhe
goal of litigation is not for the side with the best strategy to win; rather the goal
should be to seek the ultimate truth at issue in the matter.") (citing Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)); Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 321 (N.H. 1986)
(same); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1987) (insisting that "a trial is essentially a search for the truth," and "[t]he
policy of the law is to allow all competent, relevant evidence to be produced,
subject only to a limited number of privileges"); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory
committee's note (1983) ('The purpose of discovery is to provide a mechanism
for making relevant information available to the litigants.... Thus the spirit of
the rules is violated when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical
weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues .. ").
105. Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 223 A.2d 303, 305 (Me.
1966) ("The opinion of the expert is a fact which the fact finders may be entitled
to know. The cry of 'privilege' does not stop the Court and jury from hearing
the opinion of the expert in the search for the truth.").
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sion making.' 0 6 The creation of a general evidentiary rule with
a clear standard for admitting consultative expert testimony
would allow courts to avoid confusion and steer clear of the conflicting policies of the current system.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: REVISING THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
A.

CREATING RULE

707 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Because federal and state courts have failed to solve the
nontestifying expert dilemma, Congress' 0 7 should clarify and
define the law in this area by amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence to include a uniform rule to address this problem. This
uniform, federal rule should establish a standard by which a
trial court may admit
or compel the adverse party's consultative
08
expert testimony.'
106. E.g., Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1241-42 (Ariz. 1982) (determining that no privilege protects consultative expert's testimony and reasoning
that court has discretion to exclude that testimony under Rule 403); Fenlon, 506
A.2d at 322 (noting that courts should rely upon evidentiary rules such as Rule
403 to address this issue of admitting consultative expert testimony rather than
the discovery rules of Rule 26); Cogdell, 531 A.2d at 1381 (relying upon more
open discovery policy underlying Rule 26 and evidentiary rules governing admissibility of expert testimony).
107. The process for amending the Federal Rules of Evidence is multistaged.
The Judicial Conference includes the Chief Justice, each chief circuit judge, the
Court of International Trade chief judge, and a district judge from each circuit.
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988 & Supp. 1994). It "[prescribes] and [publishes] the procedures for the consideration" of proposed amendments to the federal rules. 28
U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1) (1988). The Judicial Conference may create committees
composed of Supreme Court justices, attorneys and judges to assist in the consideration of proposed amendments. Id. § 2073(a)(2). After considering the
proposals, the Supreme Court must transmit its proposed recommendations to
Congress before May 1 of the year in which the amendments would take effect.
28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988). Absent contrary congressional action, the proposed
amendments become effective on December 1 of that year. Id.
In addition, Congress itself may initiate amendments to the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Becker & Orenstein, supra note 17, at 859. In the past, Congress
has responded to calls for procedural reform of Rule 26. Indeed, recent changes
in Rule 26 address concerns raised by commentators and litigators alike. For
example, many commentators indicated general dissatisfaction with the rule's
preference for interrogatories in the discovery of experts. See Graham, supra
note 1, at 172-74; Wildermuth, supra note 1, at 940-42 (describing studies). The
1993 amendments to Rule 26 eliminate this interrogatory provision. FED. R.
Cxv. P. 26.
108. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to federal courts. FED. R. Evm.
101. A majority of state courts, however, have adopted them. WmESTrmN,
supra note 51, at T-1, T-5 to T-9, and T-88 to T-91 (describing states that have
adopted Federal Rules of Evidence and any changes each state made in Rule
101 and Rules 702 and 703, concerning expert witnesses).

1210

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1191

Specifically, Rule 707 should admit the consultative expert
testimony if the proffering party demonstrates a reasonable
need for the testimony and agrees to pay the expert reasonable
fees for her testimony. The amended rule could read as follows:
An expert, retained by a party in anticipation of litigation as a nontestifying witness, may testify for the opposing party if that party demonstrates a reasonable need for the expert's testimony.

The advisory committee's note should further define the
contours of what constitutes "reasonable need." As an illustration, the unavailability of other experts or the opposing party's
bad faith retention of experts to shield them from discovery
could constitute reasonable need. The court may also consider
the proffering party's inability to locate a comparable expert, as
when one party lacks the financial resources to retain an expert
outside of the jurisdiction. In deciding whether to compel an expert's testimony, the trial court should give serious consideration to the proffering party's amenability to pay the expert' 0 9
and the expert's willingness to testify. 110 The reasonable need
standard would prevent bad faith litigation tactics, but would
allow more access to consultative expert testimony than Rule 26
makes available.
The reasonable need standard differs from Rule 26's "exceptional circumstances"""' standard in both its goals and practice.
Rule 707 would regulate consultative expert testimony, while
Rule 26's exceptional circumstances standard affects only discovery, because Rule 26 does not authorize a party to either request or compel the opponent's consultative expert to testify.
Additionally, the two standards assess different factors. The exceptional circumstances standard considers: the near impossibility of otherwise obtaining the information sought in
discovery, a "substantial need" for the information, and the demonstrable fairness of the discovery. 112 Under Rule 707, courts
109. Carrasquillo v. Rothschild, 443 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)
(reasoning that proffering party should pay for expert's time in testifying).
110. See, e.g., id. (stating that expert must be willing to work with other side
before court will compel testimony); see also infra note 135 and accompanying
text (stating that fairness requires that expert be available to proffering party).
But see Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 322 ("The expert's desire not to testify . . .[is]
immaterial.").
111. Under Rule 26, the party seeking discovery of a consultative expert
must demonstrate "exceptional circumstances." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
112. Virginia G. Maurer, Compelling the Expert Witness: Fairnessand Utility under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 19 GA. L. REV. 71, 91 n.74 (1984)
(citing Thomas R. Trenkner, PretrialDiscovery of Facts Known and Opinions
Held by Opponent's Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of FederalRules of Civil Procedure, Annotation, 33 A.L.R. FED. 403, 465-74 (1977)).
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would consider: the inability to locate a comparable expert without undue burden, the number and quality of other experts readfly available to the party, bad faith expert shielding, the amount
of time and money the retaining party has invested in the contested expert, the extent to which the expert assisted in creating
a theory of the case, and additional considerations of fairness.
Courts may also consider the disparity of resources between the
parties, especially if one party uses its greater resources to "buy"
local experts and force the other party to search for experts out
of state, incurring a greater cost.
The reasonable need standard creates a threshold that the
proffering party must cross to examine the opponent's expert.
The trial court must first determine whether the proffering
party has met the reasonable need standard before applying
Rule 403, which excludes evidence that may prejudice the trier
of fact. Unlike Rule 403, which addresses already relevant and
otherwise admissible testimony, the proposed amendment requires the proffering party to meet the reasonable need test
before the court may admit the expert's testimony. Of course,
once the court admits the expert's testimony, Rule 403 applies to
the testimony itself.1 1 3 Rule 403 thus prevents the possibility of
unfair prejudice springing from the expert's testimony. This
built-in flexibility enables the trial court to answer the specific
needs of each case while following a uniform, general rule.
B.

ATTRIBUTES OF THE REASONABLE NEED TEST AND ITS
IMPACT UPON THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF EXPERT

TESTIMONY

The proposal set forth in this Note offers flexibility and stability and relies upon existing evidentiary protections. Although
the conflicting case law of consultative expert testimony demonstrates the need for uniform regulation, this rule does not advocate either automatic admission or exclusion of the disputed
expert testimony. Automatic admission may allow abusive manipulation of the discovery and use of evidence at trial. By the
same token, automatic exclusion of the expert testimony may
encourage shielding consultative experts. Creating a reasonable
need standard in Rule 707 provides the stability of a general
113. See, e.g., Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 322 (noting that consultative expert's testimony is still subject to Rule 403's ban against prejudicial, misleading, and
cumulative evidence). Thus, a court may still apply Rule 403 to exclude testimony regarding the expert's prior employment vith the opposing party. See
infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
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rule, which will allow the trial court to encourage a more constant exchange of information and discourage expert
shielding. 114
Even if the trial court determines that questioning an expert about original retention by the adverse party is unfair, the
trial court may still allow the expert to testify. The court has
several ways to insure that inflammatory or highly prejudicial
evidence does not taint the trial record. The trial court may use
either Rule 403 or a motion in limine" 15 to limit the direct examination to the expert's opinion, omitting reference to the expert's
prior retention by the adverse party.1 16 The trial court can readily enforce this restriction:117 the expert may mention earlier
reports or material the expert used in formulating a conclusion
114. See, e.g., Bockweg v. Anderson, 117 F.R.D. 563, 566 (M.D.N.C. 1987)
(allowing additional discovery of the opponent's expert and stating that
although "discretion creates uncertainty, it also permits a more reasoned decision, taking into account the peculiarities and needs of each case and the benefit of the Court's growing experience").
115. ROGER C. PARK, TRaAL OBJEcTIoNs HANDBOOK 4-5 (1991) (discussing
motion in limine). The court may also grant a limiting instruction. Id. at 18.
116. This scenario assumes that the expert's testimony about her recent
work with the retaining party meets the reasonable need test, but fails the Rule
403 balancing test. See id. at 18. Park explains that "[elven if evidence is ruled
admissible, the purposes for which the evidence can be used may be limited.
Or, only part of it may be admissible." Id. In that case, the objecting trial attorney should request a limiting instruction. Id.
117. A sample direct examination of the adverse party's consultative expert
(after qualifying the witness as an expert) in a medical malpractice action
might proceed as follows:
Q. Did you examine Mr. Smith?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
as to the cause of Mr. Smith's injury?
A. I do.
Q. What is your opinion?
A. I think the XYZ drug administered by Dr. Jones did not cause Mr.
Smith's injury.
Q. Did you examine Mr. Smith's medical reports?
A. Yes.
Q. Who gave you those medical reports? -Objection.
Sustained.
As soon as the attorney conducting the direct examination asks the expert
about the source of the documents she examined, the adverse party may object.
The trial court may thus exclude the fact that the expert previously worked for
the adverse party.
By extension, if reports or other documents come into evidence through the
expert and those papers contain the original employing party's name, the trial
court may strike its name from the documents to remove any trace of the original source of the information upon which the expert relied.
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but may not directly reveal having obtained this information
118
from the adverse party.
Rule 707 will not alter the federal rules concerning a trial
court's ability to subpoena an expert witness. 1 9 The court's
power to compel expert testimony, however, is limited to the
scope of its subpoena power. 120 This factor narrows the extent
to which consultative expert testimony will be compelled against
the expert's will.
As a federal evidentiary rule, Rule 707 will apply to both
civil and criminal trials. 121 In criminal trials, however, different
factors will arise. 12 2 For example, prosecutors already must reveal beneficial evidence to the defendant. 123 Criminal courts
118. See, e.g., Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765, at *4 (D. Kan.
Mar. 27, 1986) (noting that the court may avoid concerns about crafty crossexamination through "careful limitations on the type of questions allowed to be
posed to these experts").
119. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The
weight of authority holds that, although it is not the usual practice, a court does
have the power to subpoena an expert witness and, though it cannot require
him to conduct any examinations... it can require him to state whatever opinions he may have previously formed.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
929 (1973).
120. Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits the court's power
to subpoena a "person who is not a party or an officer of a party" to 100 miles
from "the place where that person resides, is employed or regularly transacts
business in person." FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). In criminal trials, however,
a subpoena "requiring the attendance of a witness" at trial "may be served at
any place within the United States." FED. R. Cmiu. P. 17(e)(1). Additional criminal discovery rules limit this far-reaching subpoena power in criminal trials.
See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
121. The Federal Rules of Evidence "govern proceedings in the courts of the
United States...." FED. R. EvID. 101.
122. The federal criminal rules governing discovery differ from Rule 26.
Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which regulates discovery, if the defendant requests a summary of the prosecution's expert testimony, the government must provide this summary and the defendant, in
return, must disclose a summary of its expert testimony. FED. R. Crum. P.
16(a)(1)(E) and 16(b)(1)(C). "[Sitatements" made by either of the two parties'
"prospective witnesses" are not "subject to disclosure." FED. R. Cami. P. 16(a)(2)
and 16(b)(2). Like Rule 26, however, Rule 16 does not refer to calling or compelling the opponent's consultative expert to testify because the summary "only
applies to expert witnesses that each side intends to call." FED. R. CRIm. P. 16
advisory committee's notes.
Expert testimony in criminal cases arises in another context. If a defendant intends to call an expert to testify about the defendant's mental condition,
he must notify the government in advance. FED. R. Cram. P. 12.2(b).
123. The prosecution has a constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant if the evidence is "'material'... [defined as] 'a reasonable probability' that, had disclosure been made, the 'result of the proceeding
would have been different.'" WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMNAL
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should emphasize the importance of fundamental fairness when
considering a request to allow or compel the defendant's consult1 24
ative expert to testify against the defense.
The proposed amendment is consistent with the rules governing civil discovery. Rule 707 does not alter Rule 26's prohibition of deposing a consultative expert until the requesting party
demonstrates "exceptional circumstances." 1 25 Indeed, formal
discovery is not always necessary. If a consultative expert voluntarily agrees to testify for the opposing party, as in the
Healy1 26 case, the expert will tell that party what it needs to
know to prepare for direct examination. 12 7 Admittedly, this informal discovery process cannot occur when the consultative expert does not want to testify for the opponent. In that case, the
proffering party must either meet the exceptional circumstances
requirement of Rule 26128 or find an external source of the expert's opinion, such as published articles or, as in the Fenlon
case, 12 9 a report written by the expert. 13 0 If not, the proffering
party may have to content itself with the opportunity to directly
§ 20.7, at 890 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667 (1985)).
124. Courts may be reluctant to allow the prosecution to call the defendant's
expert, while allowing the defendant to call or compel the prosecution's expert
to testify. A court probably will not admit the defendant's former expert's testimony, barring unusual circumstances. For example, in Morris v. State, the
court allowed the prosecution to summon an expert, whom the defense initially
consulted, to testify because the scientific tests that the expert performed on
the accused's clothing destroyed the clothing. 477 A.2d 1206, 1211-12 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1984). The Morris court determined that admitting the testimony
best served societal interests. Id.
If the prosecution, on the other hand, obtains an unfavorable expert opinion about the defendant's mental condition or other beneficial information, the
government must disclose this information to the defendant. See LAFAvE &
ISRAEL, supra note 123, at 883-95 (describing historical emergence of government's duty to disclose).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
126. 100 F.R.D. at 494; see supra text accompanying notes 5-7 (describing
facts of case).
127. The consultative expert must be careful not to break an agreement
with the original retaining party in disclosing this information to the opposing
party.
128. Indeed, the circumstances giving rise to a reasonable need for the consultative expert's testimony may meet the exceptional circumstances standard.
For example, the retaining party may have employed bad faith tactics such as
expert shielding.
129. 506 A.2d at 320; see supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
130. In addition, if the retaining party first designated the expert as a testifying witness, it gave the proffering party a report describing, inter alia, the
substance of the expert's testimony and qualifications. FED. R. Cirv. P.
26(a)(2)(B). The proffering party thus generally knows about the expert's opinPROCEDURE

1994]

CONSULTATIVE EXPERT TESTIMONY

1215

examine the expert at trial, and forego formal discovery of the
expert's opinion. A party might be willing to risk allowing the
expert to testify without formal discovery if the expert is the
only one within the party's jurisdiction who speaks
13 1
articulately.
The proposed amendment may affect expert discovery in
several different ways. It may encourage attorneys to select
only experts who will are sure to agree with their view of the
case. Perhaps attorneys will rely more upon testifying experts.
32
Rule 707 should impair the effectiveness of expert shielding'
because consultative experts would no longer be locked away
from the opposing party.
C.

RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENT

Critics attack the admission of consultative expert testimony on several grounds. They claim the testimony is unfair
and leads to abusive discovery practices as well as ethical
problems. 133 Each of the critics' arguments for excluding the
contested expert testimony, however, generates an argument
supporting its admission.
The proposed amendment prevents unfairness. The unfairness rule prohibits the discovering party from obtaining beneficial testimony at its opponent's expense.' 3 4 The unfairness rule
may actually justify admitting the consultative expert's testiion. Admittedly, this general knowledge is not as helpful as a formal deposition, but, it is better than no information at all.
131. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing superficial characteristics sought in testifying expert). In some fields, for example, an expert's
ability to either describe technical terms in easy to understand vernacular or
his ability to speak English fluently may well be important to the party proffering his testimony. Supra note 2.
132. See McDonald, supra note 32.
133. Courts have stated several reasons to exclude the consultative expert's
testimony. See, e.g., Campbell Indus. v. MV Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 26-27 (9th
Cir. 1980) (using Rule 26 itself); Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 496-97 (D.
Colo. 1984) (expressing fear of negative impact that allowing adverse party's
consultative experts to testify would have upon availability of consultative experts); Piller v. Kovarsky, 476 A.2d 1279, 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984)
(excluding consultative expert's testimony because it was protected by
privilege).
134. The unfairness rule, however, does not necessarily exclude the consultative expert's testimony because it is not a privilege. See Friedenthal, supra
note 32, at 479 (describing rule as policy preference). Courts must thus approach the unfairness rule within its policy context and not as a principle of
absolute exclusion.
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mony. Courts have already allowed consultative experts to testify out of fairness to the proffering party.13 5 Excluding the
13 6
expert's testimony allows a party to "buy" an expert's opinion.
Paying an expert, however, does not give a party exclusive
rights to the expert's opinion. 137 Otherwise one party may "buy"
experts to hide them from the adverse party.1 38 This
argument
39
may be described as an "inverse unfairness rule."

The proposed amendment guards against discovery abuse.
Although some concern exists that allowing adverse parties to
compel each other's consultative experts to testify would open
the door to unnecessary discovery and collateral issues, 140 the
advantages outweigh the disadvantages. 14 1 By the same token,
135. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that "we do not believe that ... [the unfairness rule] is a sufficient justification for the application in condemnation cases of a rule which would deny a
litigant the testimony of a witness rejected by his opponent simply because his
opponent reached the witness first and paid for his services"); Fenlon v. Thayer,
506 A.2d 319, 321-23 (N.H. 1986) (reasoning that trial is search for truth and
that because consultative expert's testimony assists jury in that search, court
should admit testimony in fairness to proffering party); Carrasquillo v. Rothschild, 443 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (concluding that expert's opinion "should be equally available to all parties willing to pay an appropriate fee
for time consumed by travel and testimony"); see also Hayes & Ryder, supra
note 52, at 1131-32 (citing cases).
136. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also Carrasquillo, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 115 ("The testimony of a witness, particularly an expert, should be
totally unaffected by the question of which party to the litigation retains that
expert. An expert belongs to no one.") (citing Milton R. Wessel, Institutional
Responsibility, Professionalismand Ethics, 60 NEB. L. REV. 504 (1981)); cf.
Gross, supra note 1, at 1129 (relating the old joke that expert witnesses are "'a
safe legal way to buy a verdict'").
137. Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 223 A.2d 303, 305 (Me.
1966) ("The fact that the opinion was obtained at the expense of the defendant
and for its information and use only, does not force the conclusion that the expert may not testify from the stand at the request of the opposing party without
the consent of his employer."); State Highway Comm'n v. Earl, 143 N.W.2d 88,
93 (S.D. 1966) (holding that expert's previous retention by defendant "did not
create a contractual or proprietary right in either defendant or the expert to
suppress or withhold from evidence this expert's formed opinion").
138. One commentator has argued that "[tihe first party to reach and 'buy'
an expert, because of the stringent showing required for discovery of non-testifying experts, would be able to suppress unfavorable findings of that expert
simply by declining to offer his testimony at trial." Crockett, supra note 44, at
406.
139. See Wildermuth, supra note 1, at 952 (arguing that expert shielding
"may, ironically, subvert the unfairness principles [Rule 26] was designed to
remedy").
140. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (describing adverse impact of compelling consultative expert to testify).
141. Some courts acknowledge the potential of discovery abuse even as they
conclude that they favor liberal discovery of experts. The Bockweg court dis-
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however, compelling expert testimony might check the ravages
of "expert shopping" 14 2 and "expert shielding"'14 3-abuses currently employed by many litigators. If trial lawyers anticipate
facing their own expert across the witness stand, they will narrow their selection of experts instead of attempting to corner
and buy out the market.'"
Rule 707 will not alter the way litigators prepare for their
expert witnesses' testimony. Currently, many litigation publications encourage attorneys to obtain several kinds of Rule 26 experts, in order to provide both backup trial witnesses and to hide
unfavorable experts. 14 5 According to these publications, attorneys should assume that current rules protect almost none of
their expert's research from discovery 4 6 and should draft all of
the assumption that it
their correspondence with experts under147
will be discovered by the adverse party.
cussed this dilemma, and then sided with more open discovery: "[a]s matters
presently stand, the apparent advantages derived from permitting liberal discovery of expert witnesses outweigh the potential abuses." Bockweg v. Anderson 117 F.R.D. 563, 566 (M.D. N.C. 1987).
142. See, e.g., Peter I. Ostroff, Experts: A Few Fundamentals,LITIG., Winter
1982, at 8, 9 (recommending qualities that attorneys should consider in their
search for expert with the "right" opinion).
143. See McDonald, supra note 32, at 1030 (discussing extensive dangers of
expert shielding).
144. The opposing argument insists that litigators will carefully select only
experts who will agree with the parties who hire them. In this sense, by trying
to expose more of the litigator's information to the "truth" searching process,
savvy litigators will obscure the truth by paying experts whose loyalty to their
employers comes before their concern for the truth. But see Carrasquillo v.
Rothschild, 443 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (stating that courts commit "gross disservice" to experts by assuming that experts will base opinion
upon which party pays).
145. See, e.g., Suplee & Woodruff, supra note 14, at 11 (suggesting that attorneys should retain two or more types of Rule 26 witnesses so that if expert's
research or tests go awry attorney may classify expert as consultant and prevent opponent from discovering expert); Ostroff, supra note 142, at 8-9 (recommending"spare" experts because many will reach the "wrong" conclusion or will
be otherwise incompatible with party's needs).
146. See, e.g., Ostroff, supra note 142, at 9 (advising attorneys to consider all
information given to and received from experts as discoverable and further suggesting that consultative expert not talk with trial expert for fear of discovery
through trial expert); Suplee & Woodruff, supra note 14, at 17 (attorneys should
assume that nothing, including data and conversations with consultative experts, is protected from discovery); Vernon, supra note 103, at 18 (recommending that attorneys assume that any written work given to expert is
discoverable).
147. Suplee & Woodruff, supra note 14, at 17-18. In light of these assumptions, one prominent commentator advises an "exclusivity provision preventing
the expert from consulting with any other party to the litigation." Graham,
supra note 1, at 195. At this time, courts have not yet compelled an expert to
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The proposed amendment will not exclude experts from the
courtroom. Rather, it will give them greater freedom to testify.
Experts must be true to themselves and their profession. When
litigators retain experts for use as non-testifying witnesses,
they-at least in principle-hire the expert to provide an impartial, honest opinion. 148 Under the current rules of discovery,
however, the retaining party may monopolize a consultative expert, regardless of the expert's view of the case. The expert, by
agreeing to examine preliminary materials of a case, should not
feel forever bound to that side of the litigation even if the expert
disagrees with it.149 The proposed amendment thus permits a
consultative expert the opportunity to serve the party that the
expert opinion supports if that party demonstrates a reasonable
need for the testimony. In this way, the expert obtains freer access to the courtroom, not banishment from it.
CONCLUSION
In light of the conflicting case law and procedural rules,
Congress should promulgate an evidentiary provision concerning the consultative expert witness dilemma. The rule should
allow experts retained as nontestifying witnesses to testify at
trial for the adverse party if the proffering party demonstrates a
reasonable need for the testimony. This regulation best suits
the more open discovery and evidentiary policies currently in
place. If such testimony proves to be too prejudicial, the trial
court may always exclude or properly limit the scope of the expert's testimony. By promulgating this rule, experts may yet
again prove a valuable source of information for the trier of fact.

testify despite an exclusivity clause in the expert's contract with the original
party. Id.
148. Some courts emphasize the fact that the expert is not bound by the
source of her payment. Carrasquillo,443 N.Y.S.2d at 115 (reasoning that "[to
conclude that the opinion will in any way, be based on which party pays for the
examination... and on which party pays for the testimony, does gross disservice to the expert and to his or her integrity").
149. Commentators split on this issue. Some contend that experts naturally
would support the party that hired them or, would not attempt to talk to the
adverse party. Platt, supra note 39, at 363. Other commentators note that experts who are not retained to testify, but to "brief" the attorney may be quite
surprised to find they cannot offer their testimony to the side with whom they
agree. See Gross, supra note 1, at 1150.

